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ST~TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State charged Danielle Mona Lisa Duff with felony driving under the 
influence. She was convicted of driving under the influence following a jury trial, and the 
district court subsequently found that Ms. Duff had a prior driving under the influence 
conviction. Ms. Duff filed a Motion for New Trial wherein she asserted that the district 
court improperly summarized the arresting officer's qualifications to the jury. The district 
court denied the Motion for New Trial. It imposed a sentence upon Ms. Duff of ten 
years, with five years fixed, and placed her on probation for three years. 
Ms. Duff timely appealed from her judgment of conviction. On appeal, she 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted improper opinion 
testimony from Officer Mumford regarding the horizontal gaze nystagmus (hereinafter, 
HGN) test and when it denied her Motion for New Trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Duff was pulled over by Office Mumford around 11 p.m. because he 
observed her truck cross over the double yellow center line and she was coming from 
an area that had "bars and stuff." (Tr., p.122, Ls.6-25.) When questioned about 
crossing the line, Ms. Duff told Officer Mumford that her truck was difficult to control and 
that she had trouble controlling it even when she was sober. (Tr., p.124, Ls.10-14.) 
Officer Mumford testified that he found her statement odd because "it is just not 
something people normally make a statement like that at first." (Tr., p.124, Ls.22-24) 
Defense counsel objected as to foundation. (Tr., p.124, L.25.) The district court 
responded by stating in front of the jury, "Overruled. He has testified he has 2500 hours 
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of training. He is POST certified at the masters !eveL He has over 1200 DUI arrests 
and he has participated in intentional dosing of persons to test." (Tr., p.125, Ls.1-4.) 
Throughout the trial, the district court repeatedly overruled defense counsel's 
foundation objections by stating that Officer Mumford's testimony was based on his 
"training and experience." Officer Mumford was permitted to testify at length about his 
various feelings and experiences relating to car crash investigations, domestic violence 
investigations, military experience, and drunk people in general: 
Officer Mumford: I just - the role of the job of the sheriff's deputy it 
seems that a high majority of calls or a high majority 
of contacts with people - especially I like to work the 
night shifts. I like to work the back side of the week, 
in other words, the weekend shift. So a high majority 
of the people I talk to, just being where I put myself, is 





Overruled. It is based upon his training and his 
experience. 
Officer Mumford: And it ranges from anywhere to just talking to the 
simple person on the street to backing a deputy for 
domestic violence or doing a traffic enforcement and 
doings DUls or crash investigations 
(Tr., p.114, L.18 - p.115, L.8.) 
Officer Mumford: Sometimes people, such as myself, I was in the 
military for nine years. I was around a lot of people -
Defense: Objection. Move to strike, 
aggrandizement of the deputy's 





The Court: Overruled. We are laying foundation. Rules of 
evidence don't apply to determination of preliminary 
questions of fact. 
Officer Mumford: When I was in the military I spent a lot of time around 
people that drink, so I got to see firsthand. And then 
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bringing those experiences with me when I then 
became a civilian law enforcement officer, I put those 
parts of my war chest into effect of just my 
experiences of talking to people. 
(Tr., p.117, L.21-p.118, L.11.) 
Thereafter, when discussing the HGN test, Office Mumford opined, "At 45 
degrees - when you look at your 45 degrees, the chances are likely or better than likely 
that the person is under the influence." (Tr., p.133, Ls.23-25.) Defense counsel 
objected on foundation grounds, to which the district court responded: "Overruled. 
Training and experience." (Tr., p.134, L.3.) Officer Mumford went on to state that, 
based on Ms. Duff's eyes alone, there was a very good likelihood that she was under 
the influence. (Tr., p.134, L.25 - p.135, L.1.) 
Officer Mumford also testified that he administered the walk-and-turn test and the 
one-legged-stand test. (Tr., p.136, Ls.9-10, p.142, Ls.20-21.) He said that Ms. Duff 
missed three points on the walk-and-turn test, but she passed the one-legged-stand 
test. (Tr., p.142, Ls.16-19, p.143, Ls.13-15.) Finally, Officer Mumford took a single 
breath sample that produced a result of 0.119 percent. (Tr., p.165, L.25 - 166, L. 1.) 
The jury convicted Ms. Duff of driving under the influence. (R., p.200.) 
Thereafter, the district court found that Ms. Duff had a prior felony DUI conviction, which 
elevated her charge to a felony. (R., pp.249-251.) Ms. Duff filed a Motion for New Trial 
pursuant to I.C.R. 34 and I.C. § 19-2406(5), wherein she asserted that the district court 
"reiterated at length, in the presence of the jury, the training and schooling of the officer, 
in such a manner that a trier of fact could have and probably did take it as judicial 
instruction." (R., pp.232-33.) The district court denied Ms. Duff's Motion for New Trial. 
(R., pp.235-241.) The district court imposed a sentence of ten years, with five years 
fixed, and placed Ms. Duff on three years of probation. (R., pp.258-263.) 
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Ms. Duff timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.265-68.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted testimony from Officer 
Mumford regarding the likelihood of intoxication based on HGN results? 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Officer Mumford's Opinion 
That A Person Is "Better Than Likely" Under The Influence If Nystagmus Is Present 
Prior To 45 Degrees 
A. Introduction 
Officer Mumford testified that a person is "better than likely" under the influence if 
nystagmus 1 is present prior to 45 degrees. He further testified that there was a very 
good likelihood, based on the HGN test results alone, that Ms. Duff was under the 
influence. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly and specifically held that an 
arresting officer may only testify that the presence of nystagmus may be an indication of 
intoxication. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Officer 
Mumford to opine about the relationship between the HGN test and a person's 
likelihood of being under the influence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate courts review trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence 
under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 732 (2001 ). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Officer Mumford's 
Opinion That A Person Is "More Than Likely" Under The Influence If Nystagmus 
Is Present Prior To 45 Degrees 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, although the HGN test is scientifically 
reliable, it may only be used in conjunction with evidence from other field sobriety tests 
1'"Nystagmus' is a term used to describe an involuntary jerking of the eyeball, a 
condition that may be aggravated by the effect of chemical depressants on the central 
nervous system. An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned 
from side to side is known as 'horizontal gaze nystagmus.'" State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 
134, 138 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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and the arresting officer is only permitted to testify that "nystagmus may be an indicator 
of intoxication, not that it is conc!usive evidence." State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66 
(1992) (italics in original); see aiso State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 880-83 (1991) 
(discussing the scientific validity of HGN and the required competency of the testifying 
officer); State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 138-39 (Ct. App. 2013) (stating that HGN 
testimony is admissible as reliable under 1.R.E. 702, but is subject to limitations 
regarding the inferences that may be drawn from the presence of nystagmus). 
Here, Officer Mumford offered an opinion about the relationship between 
nystagmus and the likelihood of intoxication. He testified that if nystagmus is present 
prior to 45 degrees, then "the chances are likely or better than likely that the person is 
under the influence." (Tr., p.133, Ls.23-25.) Defense counsel objected as to 
foundation. (Tr., p.134, L.2.) The district court responded, "Overruled. Training and 
experience." (Tr., p.134, L.3.) Officer Mumford went on to testify that, based on 
Ms. Duff's eyes alone, "there was a very good likelihood that she was under the 
influence." (Tr., p.134, L.25 - p.135, L.1.) This is exactly the type of testimony that the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett and Gleason held inadmissible. 
In Gleason, the Idaho Supreme Court ultimately held that the trial court did not 
err in admitting the officer's testimony because the officer testified that "based on 
Gleason's performance on the HGN and other tests, Deputy Wolfinger was of the 
opinion that Gleason was intoxicated." Gleason, supra, 123 Idaho at p.66 (italics in 
original). Here, however, Ms. Duff is not challenging Officer Mumford's ultimate opinion 
that he arrested her because he believed she was under the influence. Rather, she is 
challenging Officer Mumford's statement that intoxication can be determined from the 
HGN test alone and that a certain HGN result increases the likelihood of intoxication. 
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Because the State did not lay any foundation for Officer Mumford's erroneous opinion, 
and the content of the opinion itself is specifically precluded by the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decisions in Garrett and Gleason, the district court abused its discretion when it 
admitted the testimony based upon Officer Mumford's "training and experience." 
11. 
The District Court Abused its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Duff's Motion For New Trial 
A. Introduction 
In her Motion for New Trial, Ms. Duff asserted that the district court "reiterated at 
length, in the presence of the jury, the training and schooling of the officer, in such a 
manner that a trier of fact could have and probably did take it as judicial instruction." 
(R., p.232.) Further, the district court's espousing of Officer Mumford's qualifications 
was exacerbated by the fact that the district court repeatedly overruled defense 
objections to Officer Mumford's testimony by stating to the jury that Officer Mumford's 
testimony was based on his "training and experience." Because Officer Mumford was 
the only witness at trial and the State's entire case rested on his qualifications and 
credibility, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Duff's Motion for 
New Trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 687 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Duff's Motion For 
New Trial 
Idaho Code section 19-2406 sets forth the circumstances in which a new trial 
may be granted. One such circumstance where a new trial may be granted is "when the 
court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of any 
question of law arising during the course of the trial." I.C. § 19-2406. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has advised, "Remarks or comments by a trial judge which would tend 
to prejudice either of the parties to a jury trial are proscribed because of the great 
possibility that such an expression will influence the jurors." State v. White, 97 Idaho 
708, 711 (1976). A judge's remark will be deemed prejudicial if it constitutes a comment 
on the weight of the evidence or indicates an opinion of the court as to the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. Id. at 712. Here, the district court commented as follows: 
Officer Mumford: And then she makes a statement about she has an 
even hard time controlling it even when she is sober 
which sort of struck me odd because that's -
Defense: Your Honor, how these statements struck the witness 
is immaterial. We are looking for facts, not his opinion 
at this point. 
The Court: Overruled. It is part of this investigation. 
Prosecution: Go ahead, sir. 
Officer Mumford: It just sort of struck me as odd. It is just not 
something people normally make a statement like that 
at first. 
Defense: Objection. Foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. He has testified he has 2500 hours of 
training. He is POST certified at the masters level. 
He has over 1200 DUI arrests and he has 
participated in intentional dosing of persons to 
test. 
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(Tr., p.124, L.12 - p.125, L.4) (emphasis added). The district court's summary of Officer 
Mumford's qualifications was entirely unnecessary and constituted a comment on the 
evidence. Officer Mumford was the only witness at trial. There were no admissible lab 
results or independent verifications of Ms. Duffs blood alcohol level other than the tests 
performed by Officer Mumford. Officer Mumford opined that Ms. Duff was not safe to 
drive on the night in question. (Tr., p.144, Ls.6-8.) Further, the State ultimately 
prosecuted Ms. Duff on the sole theory that her blood alcohol content was over 0.08 
percent. (R., p.197.) The single breath sample obtained by Officer Mumford was the 
only piece of evidence that indicated that Ms. Duff's blood alcohol content was over 
0.08 percent, and, therefore, Officer Mumford's training and credibility were clearly at 
issue and were critical to the jury's ultimate determination. The district court did not 
merely repeat Officer Mumford's testimony. Rather, the court succinctly summarized 
Officer Mumford's testimony regarding his various training and experiences and 
presented it to the jury. In doing so, the district court essentially engaged in a mid-trial 
closing argument on behalf of the State. 
This error was exacerbated by the fact that the district court repeatedly overruled 
defense counsel's objection by telling the jury that Officer Mumford's testimony was 
based on his "training and experience." (Tr., p.115, Ls.2-3, p.134, L.3.) Additionally, in 
response to one of defense counsel's objections that the testimony regarding the 
officer's qualifications was getting out of hand, the district court replied, "Overruled. We 
are laying foundation." (Tr., p.118, Ls.2-4) (emphasis added). Most likely, the district 
court did not intend to imply that the court itself was participating in the laying of the 
foundation for Officer Mumford's testimony. However, this seemingly innocuous 
statement becomes problematic when, only a few minutes later, the district court 
10 
overruled yet another defense foundation objection by summarizing Officer Mumford's 
qualifications in front of the jury. In the context of the court's repeated references to 
Officer Mumford's training and and its that "we are 
foundation," ultimate summary of Officer Mumford's qualifications could 
misdirect the jury that the court found Officer Mumford's qualifications impressive and 
his testimony credible. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Ms. Duff's Motion for New Trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Duff respectfully requests that this Court vacate her Judgment of Conviction 
and remand her case for a new trial. 
DATED 2th day of January, 
KIJ<t1BERL Y E. SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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